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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY A. 
MADSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 14530 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
THE OPINION FAILED TO CONSIDER, ANp IS CONTRARY TO, 
ALL FINAL CASES IN POINT 
This case involves whether a mortgagee must account 
for use of tax reserves paid by the mortgagor. It is a case 
of first impression in Utah and is enormously important. It 
is filed as a class action, could affect more than 20,000 
mortgagors of defendant, and could involve millions of 
dollars. It will affect every mortgage lender in the state 
and may create scores of class actions in the courts of the 
state involving many, many millions of dollars. It will 
affect the availability of Utah lenders1 residential mort-
gage funds by affecting their ability to sell mortgages on 
the national market. The significance of the case may have 
been obscured to the Court because the Earned plaintiffs' 
case involved only $13.70 per year. 
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The case deserves careful reconsideration by the 
Court of the prior case law in point. The Court's three-to-
two opinion of January 14, 1977 totally ignored the body of 
law consisting of 19 cases dealing with mortgage tax reserves 
cited on page 23 of Respondent's Brief and page 5 of Appel-
lants' Reply Brief. Even Appellants' Brief admitted, pages 
22-3, that Brooks v. Valley Bank, 539 P.2d 958, superceded 
548 P.2d 1166 (Ariz. 1976), and Zelickman v. Bell Federal 
Savings, 301 N.E.2d 47 (111. 1973), are in point and are 
contrary to appellants' position and now the majority opin-
ion. Yet the opinion does not even mention that body of 
law. 
There is no difference between the "trust" theory 
summarily rejected in those cases and the "pledge" theory 
here. The claimed duty to account for use of the res is the 
same for a trustee as for a pledgee. T)ie idea that the 
parties intended that the mortgagee must account as a trustee 
was summarily rejected in that body of law even though the 
trust deeds said "the funds are paid in trust." That the 
trust deed here said "pledge" no more m£ans, perforce, that 
the parties intended the mortgagee must account as a pledgee 
than it did in all the "trust" cases. 
The question here is: Did thfe parties intend that 
the mortgagee pay the mortgagor for use of tax reserves. 
The majority opinion's premises are: (1) the fungible money 
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was a pledge because the trust deed used the word "pledge" 
and all elements of a pledge were preseiit (also present were 
the words and elements of a debtor/creditor, or trust, or 
mortgagee relationship); and (2) all true pledgees must at 
law account for the use of the pledge. Therefore, the 
opinion deduces the parties may have intended the mortgagee 
must account for the use of the reserve funds. The fallacy 
of that deductive reasoning flowing froin the mere presence 
of "pledge" elements in the trust deed Was shown in Sears 
v. Federal Savings & Loan Association, 275 N.E.2d 300 (Ill.App. 
1971), quoted at page 29 of Respondent's Brief. 
Not a single case was cited in the opinion nor by 
appellant for the proposition that any pledgee of money must 
account for the use of the money, and m^re specifically, not 
a single case cited in the majority opinion deals with 
mortgage reserves. Yet, by merely combining those two 
independent premises, by citing general authority about 
pledges that begs the issue, and by ignoring all final cases 
in point, the majority opinion deduced a result contrary to 
the uncontradicted facts of the admitted expressed intent of 
both parties to the contract, contrary to their admitted 11-
year practice, contrary to the admitted long established 
custom in the industry, and contrary to all final cases 
dealing with mortgage reserves. 
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We pray that the Court grant Respondent1s Petition 
for Rehearing, and that upon such rehearing, the Court 
consider in its opinion the overwhelming contrary cases from 
other jurisdictions, all dealing with mortgage reserves, 
cited in Point III of Respondent's Brief and Point VII of 
Appellants' Brief. Having done so, we pray the Court vacate 
its opinion of January 14, 1977, and that the Judgment of 
the lower court be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DATE: February 3, 1977 MOYLE & DRAPER 
Byy)^.^/^^^ 
Joseph J. Palmer 
Attorney for Respondent 
600 t>eseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Brooks v. Valley National Bank (Sup.Ct. of Ariz., 
April, 1976), 548 P.2d 1166 ("Brooks II"L supersedes the 
opinion of the Arizona Court of Appeals in Brooks v. Valley 
National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (1975) ("Brocks I"), cited at 
page 31 of respondent's brief. Brooks II sustained the 
Superior Court's granting of motion to dfLsmiss the action, 
as did Brooks I, holding: (a) a trust w^s not created for 
the impounded funds even though the word£ "in trust" were 
used in the mortgage documents, and (b) the bank was not 
unjustly enriched through use of the funds. The reasoning 
follows the opinion in Brooks I cited in respondent's brief. 
The concurring opinion in Brooks II reasloned that a trust 
was created because the bank received thle funds to be applied 
to a particular purpose but, nevertheless, the dismissal of 
the complaint was still proper, saying: 
Brooks relies on the general i^ ule of law 
that it is the duty of a trustee to pro-
tect the interests of the beneficiary of 
a trust by the exercise of reasonable 
care and diligence in the management of 
the trust property, Bulla v. valley Na-
tional Bank of Phoenix, 82 Ariz. 84, 308 
P.2d 932 (1957), and the general rule that 
that trustee has a duty to invest the 
trust property so that it is made produc-
tive for the beneficiary. Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, §181 (1959). Where, 
however, a rule of law might otherwise 
be applicable to an agreements custom or 
usage may make such rule of law inappli-
cable. Williston, Law of Contracts, 
§648 (3rd ed. 1961). 
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The practice of requiring impound 
payments has existed since the early 
1930's, In every instance, without ex-
ception, where a suit has been brought 
to compel payment of interest or the 
the impound 
has not 
earnings on the investment of 
funds, the lending institution) 
paid the mortgagor for the use| of the im-
pound funds. Nor is there anywhere the 
slightest suggestion that the Valley Na-
tional Bank or any lending institution 
ever paid for the use of impound funds. 
While a few isolated instances will 
not prove a usage, one so firmly estab-
lished for so many years nationwide should 
be controlling. A usage will 
it is uniform, long established, and so 
well known that it can be said that the 
parties contracted with reference to it 
and the failure to conform to 
the exception. Cleveland etc. 
it would be 
R.R. Co. v. 
811, Nor Jenkins, 174 111 398, 51 N.E. 
is a usage invalid because it^ effect is 
different from a general rule of law. 
It is well settled i^ hat a trade 
usage which is contrary tjo a statute 
or which contravenes public policy is 
invalid and may not be iijvoked; but 
where a rule of law is of a character 
that the parties may make it inappli-
cable to their contract by express 
agreement, they may likewise render 
it inapplicable by implied usage or 
by usage." Wolfe v. Texas Co., 83 
F.2d 425, 431 (10th Cir. 1936). 
I am therefore of the opinion that by 
banking usage neither interest): nor earnings 
on investment was expected to be credited 
to the mortgagor. 
A not-yet-reported decision i$ Throp v. Bell 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Ill.App.CPt. , Docket No. 
60252, decided July 26, 1976, aff'd on iehearing, 10-7-76. 
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It affirmed granting of defendant's motion to dismiss of 
plaintiff's claim for earnings on the escrow funds, saying 
"the use or non-use of the words 'in tri^st' is not the 
controlling criteria as to whether an express trust has or 
has not been created." It is the most xfecent decision on 
the subject and contains a review of recent authorities 
similar to other cases cited in respondent's brief. Its 
reasoning is applicable to appellants' Simplistic argument 
as to use of the word "pledge" in the mortgage document. 
Finally, we cite the Report oij Committee on Real 
Estate Financing entitled "Class Action^ Under Antitrust 
Laws on Account of Escrow and Similar Practices," Real 
Property Probate and Trust Journal of tl^ e American Bar 
Association Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, 
Volume 11, No. 2, Summer, 1976. It concludes: 
If lenders begin to pay interest on 
escrow accounts, realistically the addi-
tional expenses that result will in some 
manner be borne by borrowers either by 
a carrying charge or increase in the loan 
rates which would cover these expenses. 
In short the payment of interest on escrow 
accounts would not result in any economic 
benefit to borrowers and would in all proba-
bility increase costs at leasij: on smaller 
loans. 
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POINT I 
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENTS ON PUBLIC POLjECY 
ARE ILL FOUNDED 
Prudential has devoted the major portion of its brief to 
public policy arguments. Madsen has two general responses to such 
arguments: 
First, public policy arguments should play no role in a 
summary judgment proceeding. The reason is simple. Summary judgment 
is appropriate where there is no material fact in issue and the movant 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The public policy consid-
erations raised by Prudential depend on "material facts in issue.11 
If this case is to be influenced by fact-related policy considerations, 
the matter should be remanded for further factual development by a 
trial. As the record now stands, all of Prudential's policy arguments 
are merely unsupported self-serving speculation. 
Prudential's public policy argument$ basically boil down to 
scare tactics. Prudential argues at length about all of the dire 
results that will follow if it loses. The argument apparently goes 
like this: 
1. The home mortgage business is important to society. 
2. The home mortgage business is complicated. 
3. The home mortgage business now works well. 
4. The courts should not tamper w^th an important economic 
system which seems to be working well. 
5. Madsen1s potential recovery is minimal. 
6. The courts should not break up [an important economic 
institution simply to provide some minimal relief to 
Madsen. 
That is a very appealing argument. The trouble is that all 
of the premises are false. For example, Prudential argues that, "the 
claim of Madsen, if successful, would adversely affect the market-
ability of mortgages in the secondary market." Brief of Respondent, 
p. 7. However, there is simply no basis in this record to conclude 
that this or any one of Prudential's other scare stories would come 
true if Madsen wins this case. 
This has been conclusively demonstrated by the recent action 
of the Bank of America (see Brief of Appellant, p.18-19). The Bank of 
America is the largest banking institution in the world. It has 
voluntarily started a program to pay a regular passbook savings rate 
of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Not one of Prudential's 
scare stories has come true to haunt Bank of America. 
Madsen is tempted to respond in kind by theorizing for several 
pages on the beneficial economic results of requiring Prudential to pay 
interest on the impound funds. However, it is difficult to see how such 
speculation by either Madsen or Prudential is material to this lawsuit. 
POINT II 
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES CANNOT BE CONSIDERED 
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Prudential's brief is laced with arguments about what the 
parties intended. Apparently, Prudential's position is that the parties 
did not intend that interest be paid on the impound funds, and that the 
contract should be construed to follow the intent of the parties. 
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The problem is that in a contract ckse intent is a jury 
issue. In other words, if the contract is on its face unambiguous, 
the court can grant summary judgment as a mat|ter of law. However, if 
the contract is ambiguous, the court may look] to the intent of the 
parties as an aid in construction. However, intent is a fact issue 
and cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment. 
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, 366 F.Si^ pp. 464 (1973 DC Del.), 
Ball v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 58 FRD.^62 (1973 DC Ky.). 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION 
IS INAPPLICABLE 
Prudential's argument on practical construction is but 
another way for the court to determine the ibtent of the parties. 
Madsen has already responded to the "intent" argument in Point II 
above. However, something further needs to be said about the doctrine 
of practical construction. 
Prudential's argument is basically that no one has ever 
complained about Prudential keeping the profits on the impound funds 
— therefore the parties must have intended that Prudential could keep 
the profits. 
There is, however, one fatal flaw in the argument. It is 
true that at the time the contract was signed Madsen did not demand 
or expect profits on the impound funds. Hoyever, there is nothing in 
this record to show that Madsen was ever aware that Prudential was 
investing the funds and earning a profit onl such investments. 
Certainly Prudential made no such disclosure. 
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This lawsuit arises because Prudential, without the knowledge 
or consent of Madsen, invested the impound funds and earned a profit. 
Madsen seeks a share of that profit. The doctrine of practical 
construction cannot apply here because Madsen did not know that 
Prudential had invested his money and earned a profit thereon. Madsen 
could not ask for his share of the earnings since he did not know that 
such earnings existed. 
POINT IV 
PRUDENTIAL HAS AVOIDED THE CENTRAL ISSUE 
OF A COMMON LAW PLEDGE 
Madsen1s major thesis is that Prudential holds the impound 
funds as a common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is liable 
to the pledgor for any profit or increase in the pledged property. 
Prudential attempts to dispose of this important issue in 
one short paragraph by arguing that "a pledge is the passing of a 
chattel." Brief of Respondent, p.30-31. 
However, at common law money was considered a chattel and 
could be pledged. In 2 Blackstonefs Commentaries 385, it is said: 
"That things personal, by our law, not only includes 
things moveable, but also something more; the whole of 
which is comprehended under the general name of 
chattels, which, Sir Edward Coke says, is a French 
word signifying goods. fIn the grand coustumier of 
Normandy, (he observes) a chattel is described as a 
mere moveable, but at the same time is set in opposi-
tion to a fief or feud so that not only goods, but 
whatever was not a feud, were accounted chattels; and 
it is in this latter, more extended negative sense, 
that our law adopts itf. . . ." 
From Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4th Ed.) we learn that 
fief and feud were freehold estates in land. Thus, anything which is 
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not a freehold estate in land is a chattel. 
This definition of chattel was adopted by the Supreme Court 
of the United States in In re Gay's Gold, 80 tj.S. (13 Wall.) 358 (1871) 
There it was said, "the word chattel, in its ordinary signification, 
includes every species of property which is nc}t real or freehold. . . . 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 362. 
As to money specifically, State v. flartlett, 55 Me.200 (1867) 
held that money is a chattel. That case was a prosecution for larceny 
"of the goods and chattels" of several people. The defendant asserted 
that money was neither a good nor a chattel; tjherefore, the indictment 
was defective. The Maine Supreme Court, quoting from Holthouse's Law 
Dictionary, held: "Chattels personal are generally such as are 
moveable and may be carried about the person of the owner wherever he 
pleases to go; such as money . . . ." 55 Me. 210. 
Similarly, in Gockstetter v. Williaitjs, 9 F.2d 928 (D. Mont. 
1925), which involved the insolvency of a ban]^, the court held that 
personal property includes money, and all things of a personal nature 
are under the heading chattel. 
Therefore, it is apparent that money was considered a 
chattel at common law. It does not seem to have ever been questioned 
that money could be pledged, the same as any other chattel. 
POINT V. 
CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY PRUDENTIAL 
IS NOT IN POINT 
Prudential cites seventeen cases in support of its position. 
Brief of Respondent, p.22-23. However, not one of those cases is in 
point. To begin with, all of those cases construe contracts 
different from the contract before this court. 
However, more importantly, not one of those cases speaks to 
the pledge theory urged by Madsen. Indeed, most of those cases turn 
on a trust theory. Madsen has not urged any trust theory in this 
court. 
In short, Prudential has cited seventeen cases which hold 
that banks do not hold impound funds in trust. Madsen agrees. 
However, Prudential has cited no cases which are in opposition to 
Madsen1s pledge theory. At common law, the pledgor was required to 
account to the pledgee for any increase or profit on the property 
pledged. (See Brief of Appellant, p.5-9.) 
Prudential relies most heavily upon Zelickman v. Bell 
Federal Savings, 301 N.E.2d (111. 1973), and Sears v. Federal Savings 
& Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971). It is true that the 
agreements in both of these cases included the word "pledge11. However, 
neither of those cases analyzed the legal result of a common law 
pledge. Indeed, both Zelickman and Sears assume that the impound fund 
was a pledge. The issue in those cases was whether a trust was created 
by the "pledge". 
"We must expressly reject plaintiff's argument that 
a trust is created because of use of the word 'pledge1 
in the note. . . .. This contention is a complete 
oversimplification and is based upon the most elementary 
deductive reasoning. The syllogism is: Every pledge is 
a trust. This note contains a pledge. Therefore this 
note is a trust. However, the major premise is completely 
invalid. Every pledge is not a trust. Sears v. Federal 
Savings & Loan Assoc., 275 N.E.2d 300 (111. App. 1971)." 
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It should also be remembered that Madsen's appeal deals 
with a new and unsettled area of the law. Prudential has correctly 
pointed to a number of cases dealing with related issues or different 
fact situations. However, in such a new and Unsettled area of the 
law, this court should look with caution upon the precedential value 
of a handful of cases from foreign jurisdictions. 
POINT VI 
THIS IS A JUDICIAL AND NQT A 
LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM 
Prudential has made the argument thg.t this dispute ought 
to be left to the legislature. Prudential cites no authority for 
that novel argument. Perhaps Prudential believes that the issues are 
too difficult or too important for this court to adjudicate. 
Madsen has presented a contract issye to this court. From 
time immemorial, courts have construed contracts. This contract case 
is clearly a matter for judicial adjudication. Ross v. Oregon, 227 
U.S. 150, 57 L.Ed. 458, 33 S.Ct. 220. 
CONCLUSION 
The payment by Madsen of impound funds to Prudential is a 
common law pledge. At common law the pledgee is entitled to any 
increase or profit arising out of the pledged property. Prudential 
chose the word "pledge". Prudential accepted the pledge. Then, 
without the knowledge or consent of Madsen, Prudential invested the 
pledge and earned a profit. On principles of law and justice as old 
as civilization, Madsen is entitled to the increase in the value of 
his pledge. 
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